State of Utah v. Roger anderson and Thomas E. Brackenbury : Brief of the Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
State of Utah v. Roger anderson and Thomas E.
Brackenbury : Brief of the Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.J. Harold Call, Robert Hansen; Attorneys for RespondentS. Rex
Lewis; Attorney for Appellants
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Anderson, No. 16372 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1676
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS E. 
BRACKENBURY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 16,372 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR WASA'!CB COUll'!Y, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
J. HAROLD CALL 
Wasatch County Attorney 
30 North Main Street 
Suite #3 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
s. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PBTlRSIB 
120 East 300 North Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
',' 
'' ;/ -
f.'(:" ·~-.t1: 
I ~;_ ~...,,,.) 
-// ,; " 
. \" 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS E. 
BRACKENBURY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 16,372 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
J. HAROLD CALL 
Wasatch County Attorney 
30 North Main Street 
Suite #3 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
s. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....•.•..•.•...................... ii 
NATURE OF THE CASE.. . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ..•.............•...........• 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ......•....••..•..•....•...•.... 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE •................••....•..•....... 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ..•..•................•..•....... 2 
ARGUMENT............................................... 6 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANTS ROGER ANDERSON AND THOMAS 
BRACKENBURY WERE, IN EFFECT, DENIED 
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PRELIM-
INARY HEARING. . • • . . . . • . • . . . • • • • . . . • • . • . . • . . • • • • • • • 6 
POINT II. 
SECTION 76-8-508 OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL 
CODE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND 
OVERBROAD. • . . . • • • • • . • • • . • • • . • • • • . • • . . . . . • • • . . . . . • • 14 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY ITS ERRONEOUS AND INADEQUATE ~-~ -
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY ••••.•••..•••••••.••••.•.. 18 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANTS ROGER ANDERSON AND THOMAS 
BRACKENBURY CANNOT BE GUILTY OF VIO-
LATING §76-8-508 AS A MATTER OF LAW •••.••••.•..... 25 
POINT V. 
DEFENDANT THOMAS BRACKENBURY WAS GRANTED 
IMMUNITY AND THEREFORE, WAS IMPROPERLY 
TRIED AND CONVICTED............................... 27 
CONCLUSION............................................. 32 
ii Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED: 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 
26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) •..••...•.•••••••••.•••••••• 13 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 
35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) ••.•••••••..•••••••.••••••.• 23 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 
46 s.ct. 126, 10 L.Ed. 322 (1926) ••••••••••••••••• 14 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 
95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951) •••.•••••••. ,,, ••••• ,, •••••••• 16 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 
43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) •.•••••••••••.••.••••••.•••••• 61 
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 
9 2 L . Ed • 6 8 2 ( 19 4 8 ) •••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••• , 23 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 
32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) •••••••••••••••••••••.•••••• 27 
Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ••.••••.••••••••••••••••••••• 17 
Seibold v. Turner, 20 Utah2d 165, 435 P.2d 289 (1967). 10,11 
State v. Casaias, 567 P.2d 1097 (Utah, 1977) •••••••••••• 15 
State v. Castillo, 23 Utah2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 ( 1969) •• 22 
State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 ( 1943) •••••• 12 
State v. Cutshaw, 7 Ariz.App. 210, 437 P.2d 962 (1968) 16 
State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71 P.2d 196 (1937) •••••• 7,8 
State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837 (Utah, 1978) ••••••••••••••• 14 
State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 ( 1943) ••••• 7 
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 ( 1947) •••• 22 
State v. Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah, 1975) ••••••••••• 9 
State v. King, 24 Utah 482, 68 P. 418 ( 1902) .••••.••••• 9,13 
State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542 ( 1899) ••.••••• 9 
iii Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 P.2d 290 ( 1943) ...•• 22 
State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 146 P. 300 ( 1915) .....•...•• 7 
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 ( 1952) .••• 14 
State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075 (1959) 16 
State v. Ward, 571 P.2d 1343 (Utah, 1977) ••••.•..••.••• 27. 
Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 86 S.Ct. 788, 
15 L. Ed • 2d 7 2 4 ( 19 6 6 ) • • • • • • . . • • • • . • . . • • . • • • • . • • • • 3 2 
CONSTITUTIONS CITED: 
UTAH: 
Article I, §12......................................... 8,1 
Art i c 1 e I , § 13 • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • 7 , I 
UNITED STATES: 
Amendment VI •••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••.••• 8,1 
Amendment XIV.......................................... 8,1 
STATUTES CITED: 
Haw. Rev. Stat., §710-1072 •••••••.•••••••••••••••.•••.• 18 
Tex. Penal Code Ann. tit 8, §36.05 (Vernon) ••• ·-~~·_!..... 18 
U.C.A., §76-8-501...................................... 15 
U.C.A. I §76-8-508...................................... 1,1 
15, 
18, 
25, 
U.C.A., §77-1-8(4)..................................... 9 
U.C.A., §§77-15-1, et seq •••••••••••••••••••...••..•••• 8 
U.C.A. I §77-15-2....................................... 8 
U.C.A., §77-15-8 •••.•.••.•••.•••.••..•••••.•••.••..•.•. 8 
U.C.A., §77-15-10 .•...•..•••.•••.••••••••••.•.•.•...•.. 8,: 
iv Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
u.c.A., §77-15-19 ..........••...••..••..••.•....•••••..• 
u.c.A., §77-45-21 ...••..•...••...•••..•••••...••••••••.• 
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES: 
21 Am.Jur.2d 445, Criminal Law §442 •.•••••.•••••••••••• 
81 Am.Jur.2d 94, Witnesses §58 •..••••.....•.••••••••••• 
Blacks Law Dictionary, (4th Ed., 1968) ••••••.•••••••••• 
Model Penal Code, Art. 241, §241.6 
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962) ••••••••••••••••••• 
11,12 
28,31 
7 
32 
20 
17,18 
21 Words and Phrases 605, "INFORM"..................... 21 
41A Words and Phrases 48, "TESTIFY".................... 20 
-~ -
v 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS E. 
BRACKENBURY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16,372 
This was a criminal action brought by the State of Utah 
against the defendants-appellants Roger Anderson and Thomas 
E. Brackenbury. The information charged a violation of 
U.C.A. §76-8-508, tampering with a witness. The charge 
arose out of an incident which occurred on May 28, 1978, in 
Soldier Summit, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was ·tried by a jury in Heber City, Utah, the 
Honorable Judge J. Robert Bullock, Fourth District, presiding. 
The jury found the defendants guilty as charged in the 
information. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants-appellants seek a reversal of their 
conviction and a dismissal of the information. In the 
alternative, the defendants seek a reversal and request this 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Court to remand the case for a new trial. 
srATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 28, 1978, defendant Roger Anderson was Chief of 
Police of the town of Soldier Summit, Utah. On the same 
date, defendant Thomas E. Brackenbury was Justice of the 
Peace of the town of Soldier Summit. 
In the early evening of May 28, 1978, the defendants 
entered the J & M Saloon in Soldier Summit. Defendant 
Anderson's purpose in visiting the J & M Saloon was to 
investigate miscellaneous rumors and reports he had receive1 
which concerned, among other things, the illegal sale of 
liquor. T. 153, 183. The J & M Saloon was operated by one 
of the witnesses at defendants' trial, James Garner. 
After a brief misunderstanding with the bartender, 
James Garner, and some of his patrons, the defendants seate 
themselves at the bar. After a few moments, the defendant 
Anderson requested James Garner, who was at the opposite en 
of the bar, to join him and defendant Brackenbury for a 
brief conversation. T. 41. The purpose of the conversatio 
of course, was to determine the validity of the rumors and 
reports which Anderson had previously received. 
The nature and content of the conversation that ensued 
between the defendants and Garner was the subject of 
disputed testimony at trial. Garner testified that the 
defendant Anderson immediately "got kind of huffy" and the 
conversation rapidly "ended up in an argument." T. 41,42. 
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The defendants testified, however, that Garner responded to 
their request with foul and abusive language and summarily 
ordered them to leave his premises. T. 155,183. 
During this heated argument, Ray Applegate, a transient 
truck driver, attempted to intervene in the dispute in 
behalf of James Garner. T. 58. Applegate approached the 
defendant Anderson and seated himself immediately beside 
Anderson. At the climax of the confrontation between Garner 
and Anderson, Garner ordered the defendants to "get the hell 
out of here" or "I'll have him [Applegate] throw you out." 
T. 155,86. Garner then told defendant Anderson, with 
reference to Ray Applegate, "he's my bouncer," and Applegate 
immediately acknowledged this statement. T. 155-156. 
Defendant Anderson identified himself as the Chief of Police 
of Soldier Summit after which Ray Applegate apparently 
returned to his seat in the bar. T. 58. 
The confrontation between Garner and Anderson was 
_--.. -
brought to an abrupt conclusion when James Garner struck 
defendant Anderson as he was drinking a soft drink. T. 
42,156,184. At this juncture, both Anderson and Brackenbury 
immediately left the premises and parted company. Defendant 
Brackenbury returned to his home. Defendant Anderson 
secured the assistance of Butch Curtis, Soldier Summit's 
officer on duty at the time, and returned to the J & M 
Saloon. Anderson then directed Curtis to arrest Garner on 
the charge of assaulting an officer. Curtis was then 
-3-
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assigned to transport Garner to the Utah County jail. T. 
102. 
Anderson returned to the J & M Saloon after Garner's 
arrest to gather information and to arrest Ray Applegate for 
interfering with an officer. Applegate, by his own 
admission, had consumed a significant amount of alcohol and 
was at least partially inebriated. T. 82-83. Applegate wa~ 
under the influence to the extent that is was necessary for 
defendant Anderson to assist him in walking from the bar to 
the Justice of the Peace's trailer. T. 143-144; 159; 184-
186. 
The events which took place in defendant Brackenbury's 
trailer were the subject of highly contradictory claims at 
trial. The witness Applegate testified that he was forceab: 
removed from the J & M Saloon by defendant Anderson to 
defendant Brackenbury's trailer. Applegate also claimed 
that he was intimidated in the presence of Anderson and 
Brackenbury. After certain statements had been prepared by 
Brackenbury, Applegate testified that he signed the 
statements because he would do "anything to get out of 
there." T. 88. 
But defendants Anderson and Brackenbury testified 
differently. They insisted that Applegate was completely 
drunk, and stumbled about the trailer before finally being 
placed in a seat by defendant Anderson. They also claimed 
that defendant Anderson carefully questioned Ray Applegate 
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concerning suspected illegal sales of liquor by James 
Garner. Applegate volunteered the information which 
comprised the substance of the statements later reduced to 
writing and signed by Applegate. T. 160,185-186. The 
statements have been made part of the record and in essence 
charge that James Garner was selling liquor illegally. 
Applegate, by his own admission could not read and 
write well. T. 91,99. The defendant Brackenbury testified 
that because of Applegate's inability to write the statements 
himself, he, Brackenbury, personally prepared the statements 
based upon the questioning of Applegate conducted by 
Anderson in Brackenbury's presence. Brackenbury also 
testified that the prepared statement was read by Applegate 
in final form, and that it was also read to him so that he 
might fully understand the same. T. 187-189. A copy of 
these statements is reproduced in Appendix A of this brief. 
After signing the statement in the presence of defendants 
Anderson and Brackenbury as well as George Shage,_ the Mayor 
of Soldier Summit, Ray Applegate left Brackenbury's house 
trailer and returned to the cafe attached to the trailer. 
While at the cafe, Applegate again encountered the defendant 
Anderson. He offered to buy Anderson dinner or at least a 
cup of coffee. T. 90. Applegate then returned to his tractor-
trailer rig, and left the town of Soldier Summit sometime 
around midnight. The defendants never saw Ray Applegate 
again until trial. The unsworn statements subscribed to by 
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Rcty Applegate were never used in any administrative, 
legislative, judicial proceeding or in any other manner 
until they were produced in the course of a discovery 
deposition of Brackenbury and thereafter used as evidence ir 
the course of the trial of these defendants. 
After the discovery deposition of Brackenbury by the 
County Attorney's office, the defendants Anderson and 
Brackenbury were charged with a violation of U.C.A. §76-8-
508, tampering with a witness. The defendants requested 
and were granted a preliminary hearing. But the State's ke) 
witness, Ray Applegate, was not present at the hearing. ThE 
County Attorney was given permission to introduce Applegate' 
affidavit wherein he made the substantive allegations which 
formed the foundation of the information. The defendants 
were denied their right to confront and cross-examine 
Applegate at the hearing. On this charge, the defendants 
were convicted on the 31st day of January, 1979. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS ROGER ANDERSON AND THOMAS BRACKENBURY WERE, 
IN EFFECT, DENIED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
A preliminary hearing did not exist at common law, and 
there is generally no federal constitutional right to a 
preliminary hearing. But cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 126, 95 s.ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Thus, a so-
called "right to a preliminary hearing," if any right there 
be, must derive from State statute or constitution. 21 
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Am.Jur. 2d 445, Criminal Law §442. 
The Utah Constitution provides a constitutional right 
to a preliminary hearing in Article I, §13: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment 
by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the 
State ..•. (Emphasis added.) 
Concerning Article I, §13, this Court has written: 
And before the defendant can be 
so bound over and held to answer 
by the magistrate, he is entitled 
to a preliminary hearing, unless, 
with the consent of the State, he 
waives such hearing which under the 
Constitution, the statutes, and 
authorities cited supra, he may do. 
State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71 
P.2d 196, 199 (1937). (Emphasis 
added.) 
Thus, to citizens of this State is preserved a 
constitutional right to a preliminary hearing before an 
accused can be properly held to answer for a crime. 
That the constitutional right in Utah to a preliminary 
--~ -
hearing is a "substantial one," was early recognized by this 
Court. State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 146 P.300, 304-305 
(1915). Indeed, if a defendant is denied a preliminary 
hearing, "the cause must be reversed, regardless of the other 
claimed errors in the trial. That [a] defendant cannot 
lawfully be tried and convicted on a charge upon which [he] 
was not given, or on which [he] did not waive a preliminary 
hearing is elemental. [Citations.]" State v. Jensen, 103 
Utah 478, 136 P. 2d 949, 951-952 (1943). (Emphasis added.) 
-7-
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One of the rights, long recognized, which inheres in the 
right to a preliminary hearing, is the defendant's right to 
rebutt the evidence presented by the State at such hearing. 
Freeman, supra, at 200. Moreover, the Legislature has 
~ccognized that the viability of the defendant's right to a 
preliminary hearing depends upon his ability to adequately 
counter the evidence introduced by the State. In harmony 
with this recognition, the Legislature has codified 
the procedures to be followed at the preliminary hearing. 
See Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.), §§77-15-1, et seq. Thus, 
that the defendant's presentation might be meaningful at th 
preliminary examination, §77-15-2 provides that he be given 
reasonable time to secure counsel. Section 77-15-8 grants 
the defendant the right to deploy the State's sovereign 
power in his behalf to subpoena witnesses for his presentat 
But one of the most fundamental procedures to buttress 
the defendant's right to counter the State's evidence at th 
hearing, is expressed in §77-15-10: 
The witnesses must be examined 
in the presence of the defendant, and 
may be cross examined in his behalf. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 77-15-10 guarantees the accused the right to 
confront his accusers and have them cross examined in his 
presence, from the earliest practical point in the crimina: 
prosecution process--at the preliminary hearing. This 
statutory procedural protection is consistent with the 
United States Constitution, Amendments VI and XIV, and the 
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Utah Constitution, Article I, §12, which preserve the 
defendant his right to confront his accusers at trial. See 
also U.C.A. §77-1-8(4). In Utah, the right of confrontation 
exists not only at trial, but also at the preliminary 
hearing. 
In considering Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution, 
this Court has stated: 
Under the constituion and statutes 
of the state the accused had a right to 
be present at the trial, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, and to meet 
his accusers face to face .... 
He had the right, not only to examine 
the witnesses, but to see into the 
face of each witness while testifying 
against him, and to hear the testimony 
given upon the stand. He had the 
right to see and be seen, hear and be 
heard, under such reasonable regulations 
as the law established. State v. 
Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542, 544 
(1899). (Emphasis added.) 
In elaborating upon the guarantees set forth in Mannion, 
this Court explained in State v. King, 24 Utah 482, 68 P. 
418, 419 (1902): _-....,,. -
The chief purpose in requiring that 
the accused shall be confronted with the 
witnesses against him is held to be to 
secure to the defendant an opportunity for 
cross-examination; so, that if the 
opportunity for cross-examination has been 
secured, the test of confrontation is 
accomplished. See also State v. Kendrick 
538 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah, 1975). 
The right to a preliminary hearing in this State is 
fundamental. Part and parcel of that right is the right to 
present one's rebuttal to the State's evidence. The right 
to confront one's accusers at trial is also fundamental 
-9-
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constitutional law. But in Utah, the basic right of 
confrontation and cross examination of witnesses has been 
secured the accused not only at trial, but also at his 
preliminary hearing. Section 77-15-10, supra. In light of 
these principles, defendants Anderson and Brackenbury were 
effectively denied their constitutional right to a preliminc 
hearing. 
Although the defendants were actually given a prelimiru 
hearing in this case, they were not afforded the constitut~ 
and statutory rights enumerated above; in fact, these right 
were compromised to such an extent that they were effective 
denied their constitutional right guaranteed in Article I, 
§13 of the Utah Constitution. 
The State's burden at the preliminary hearing has been 
described before by this Court: 
A preliminary hearing is the procedure 
by which the State puts on sufficient 
evidence to convince a committing magistrate 
that the crime charged has been committed and 
that there is sufficient cause to believe the 
defendant committed it. Seibold v. Turner, 
20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d 289, 290-291 (l967). 
At the preliminary hearing in this case, two witnesses 
testified for the State and were cross examined by defense 
counsel. James Garner testified as to an altercation he ~ 
had with one of the defendants on May 28, 1978. PHT 34-35 
Garner's testimony did not even remotely relate to any of 
the elements of the crime of witness tampering under U.C.A 
§76-8-508. Irvine J. Curtis testified as to two conversat 
-10-
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which he had had with the defendants, one on the night of 
May 28, 1978, and the other some weeks later. PHT 38-40. 
The testimony, if believed by the magistrate, would tend to 
estahlish that defendant Roger Anderson had used some force 
in securing the arrest of James Garner and a statement from 
Ray Applegate. But neither Garner nor Curtis testified as 
to a single element of the crime of witness tampering under 
the statute. Their testimony was irrelevant to establishing 
the elements of the crime, and the State did not meet its 
burden at the preliminary hearing to show "that the crime 
charged [had] been committed and that there [was] sufficient 
cause to believe the defendant [ s] [had] committed it." 
Seibold, supra. 
But the State supplemented the in-court testimony of 
Garner and Curtis with certain affidavits sworn to by Ray 
Applegate, the only witness of the State who could testify 
as to the elements of the crime with which defendants had 
been charged. The State sought admission of the~aocuments 
under U.C.A. §77-15-19, which reads in relevant part: 
(2) The rules of evidence for trial of 
criminal cases shall apply at the preliminary 
examination, except that hearsay evidence 
that would not be admissible at trial shall 
be admitted if the court determines that it 
would impose an unreasonable burden on one 
of the parties or on a witness to require 
that the primary source of the evidence be 
produced at the hearing, and if the witness 
or party furnishes information bearing on 
the informant's reliability and, as far as 
possible, the means by which the information 
was obtained. When hearsay evidence is 
admitted, the court, in determining the existence 
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of sufficient cause, shall consider: 
(~) The extent to which the hearsay 
q:1ali':/ of the evidence affects the weight 
it sh;_·Jld be given, and 
(b) The likelihood of evidence other 
than hearsay being available at trial to 
provide the information furnished by hearsay 
at the preliminary examination. 
An extended discussion of the merits and meaning of 
§77-15-19 was conducted by the court and counsel. See PHT 
19-30. During this discussion, counsel for the defendants 
made numerous objections to the constitutionality of §77-15 
19 (PHT 21-22, 24, 29), as well as specific objections to 
the application of the statute in this particular case. PH 
19-20, 21, 23-24, 28. 
Defendants' arguments, announced at the preliminary 
hearing and reiterated here, are essentially two. First, 
the documents produced by the State were sworn affidavits 
made by Ray Applegate, and were therefore not hearsy. The 
clear wording of the statute makes it applicable to hearsa1 
only, and the introduction of the affidavits of Applegate 
was not provided for by the statute. The State sought, fo 
the sake of its own convenience, to circumvent the 
defendants' rights under U.C.A. §77-15-10 to confront and 
cross examine the State's key witness, the effect of which 
circumvention was to compromise the defendants' right to a 
preliminary hearing under the Utah Constitution. Moreover 
this Court has expressed its disdain with the introductior 
of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings. State v. 
Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 183 (1943). (To satisf 
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its quest for convenience, the State could have produced 
Applegate at the preliminary hearing; afforded the 
defendants their full rights to confront and cross examine 
him at the hearing; and then not produced him at trial, 
introducing the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
instead. Under well-settled constitutional law, the 
defendants under such an arrangement would not have been 
denied their rights under Article I, §12 of the Utah 
Constitution, King, supra, at 419, nor under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-166, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 
26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).) 
Secondly, the statute, as it was applied in the 
preliminary hearing of these defendants, is so inconsistent 
with Article I, §§12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution and 
U.C.A., §77-15-10 that it either must be declared unconstitution-
al in tote, or be deemed to have been rendered inapplicable 
by these constitutional and statutory provisions insofar as the 
case at bar is concerned. The State's introduction of 
Applegate's affidavits completely foreclosed the defendants 
from cross examining him at the preliminary hearing ~ 
any of the elements of the alleged crime. A valuable source 
of pre-trial criminal discovery was foreclosed. Moreover, 
because the testimony of Garner and Curtis was otherwise 
insufficient to fulfill the State's burden at the hearing, 
the defendants were effectively bound over and held to 
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answer via a pseudo-preliminary hearing that was such a sh, 
as to be an unacceptable compromise of the defendants' 
constitutional rights to a qualitative hearing. That the 
dignity of the constitutional right to a preliminary hearir 
in this State might be preserved, and because the prejudicE 
to the defendants of an inadequate preliminary hearing in 
this case threatened proper trial preparation and 
presentation, the defendants respectfully request that the 
conviction be reversed. 
POINT II 
SECTION 76-8-508 OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE IS UNCONST: 
TIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD. 
The constitutional test against which a purportedly 
vague statute must be scrutinized was enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Connally v. General Construe 
269 u.s. 385, 46 s.ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926), and 
followed by this Court in State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 
250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952): 
The terms of a penal statute creating 
a new offense must explicitly inform those 
who are subject to it the conduct on their 
part which will render them liable to its 
penalties ... and a statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application violates 
the first essential of due process of law. 
Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The test of unconstitutional statutory overbreadth wa 
stated by this Court in State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 839 
(Utah, 1978): 
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A criminal statute is overbroad when 
it, in a substantial way, prohibits lawful 
acts as well as unlawful acts. 
In the case at bar, the defendants were charged with 
the violation of U.C.A. §76-8-508, which reads in pertinent 
part: 
Tampering with witness--retaliation against 
witness or informant bribery. A person is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree if: 
(1) believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise 
cause a person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely 
"Official proceedings" are defined in §76-8-501, but no 
definition or other explanation is given for the terms 
"induce," "otherwise cause," "testify," or "inform." 
A close reading of the statute divulges that the 
Legislature has failed to include, as an element of the 
offense, the requirement of a mens rea or criminal intent. 
Well-recognized terms such as "intentionally," "willfully," 
"knowingly," "recklessly," or "wrongfully" delineate the 
mental element necessary for the commission of a criminal 
act. State v. Casias, 567 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Utah, 1977). 
All of these terms are conspicuously absent from the present 
statute. 
But the term "believing" is found within the statute, 
and it obviously connotes some kind of state of mind necessary 
to the commission of the offense. The defendants suggest, 
however, that the term "believing" describes only the state 
of knowing that an official proceeding is pending or about 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to be instituted, and in no way modifies or elucidates the 
phrases "attempts to induce" or "otherwise cause." If the 
statute had contemplated a mens rea requirement as a 
necessary element of the crime of witness tampering, it 
would have had to have been written accordingly: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he [knowingly] attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely .•• 
(For the term "knowingly," any of the other terms mention~ 
above could be substituted, as long as at least one was 
present.) 
It is well-settled law that the State may make certair 
acts criminal which are unaccompanied by a mens rea. StatE 
Twitchell, 8 Utah2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1959); State 
v. Cutshaw, 7 Ariz. App. 210, 437 P.2d 962, 972-973 (1968). 
But, "the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather 
than the exception to, the principles of Anglo American 
criminal jurisprudence." Dennis v. United States, 341 u.s 
494, 499-500, 71 s. Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951). Becaus. 
of its aberrational and exceptional character as a crimina 
statute which does not prescribe a mens rea for the 
commission of the offense which it describes, §76-8-508 
compels a man of common intelligence to "guess at its me~ 
and differ as to its application," and it sweeps within it 
ambit "lawful acts as well as unlawful acts." 
No better example of the above conclusion can be four 
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than the circumstances of the present case. Ray Applegate 
was the subject of a police investigation and he was being 
interrogated at the time of the alleged commission of the 
crime, by the local chief of police, defendant Anderson. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the tremendous 
"compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" and has 
declared that the atmosphere of such investigations, "carries 
its own badge of intimidation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 457-458, 86 s.ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
Thus, the very nature of the investigation being conducted 
by defendant Anderson may have tended, in a very subtle but 
real way, to "induce" or "otherwise cause" Ray Applegate to 
"testify or inform falsely." In fact, all police investigations 
may have this same tendency, so intimidating are the usual 
circumstances, to subtlely "induce" or "otherwise cause" a 
criminal suspect or witness to inform falsely. 
Because §76-8-508 requires no mens rea as an element of 
the offense of tampering, it sweeps within its~~~bit otherwise 
lawful and innocent conduct of the police acting within the 
proper scope of their social functions. Section 76-8-508 is 
so vague that the reasonable policeman could never conclusively 
know which of his acts induced or otherwise caused criminal 
conduct under the statute. For these reasons, U.C.A. §76-8-
508 should be declared unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
(U.C.A. §76-8-508 is, with a minor exception, a carbon copy 
of Model Penal Code, Art. 241, §241.6 [Proposed Official 
Draft, 1962). Utah's sister states which have adopted this 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
section have changed the Model Penal Code text, and have 
added the necessary~ rea element. See, e.g. Haw. Rev. 
Stat., §710-1072; Tex. Pen;:il Code Ann. tit. 8, §36.05 (Vern 
The Utah provision is also broader than the Model Penal Cod 
and the Texas and Hawaii statutes in that the Utah provisio 
substitutes the broad, general term "person" in subsection 
(1) for the original, and more narrow and specific terms of 
the Model Penal Code--"witness or informant.") 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ITS 
ERRONEOUS AND INADEQUATE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
The defendants' requested instructions together with 
the instructions which the court actually gave are found ir 
the official court file on pp. 77-84, and pp. 88-101. 
Defense counsel's specific objections to the instructions ( 
the trial court are found in the Transcript on pp. 217-219. 
As noted above, U.C.A., §76-8-508 is not a paragon of clar 
important terms are undefined, and the statute's lack of a 
~ rea element tends to propound vagueness and overbread 
These statutory deficiencies had a profound effect upon t~ 
accuracy and adequacy of the instructions given the jury. 
Defense counsel objected to the instructions of the 
trial court which dealt with the elements of the crime of 
witness tampering; namely, to the court's Instructions No. 
and No. 7. In No. 6, the court read the jury the pertinen1 
st3tute for the violation of which the defendants had beer 
charged. The critical terms of the statute are left unde 
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in the Code, and the trial court failed to remedy this 
deficiency in its instructions. Defense counsel's objection 
was that No. 6 "was not followed up with specific instructions 
defining the terms that are used in the statute, which terms 
are encompassed in the Requested Instructions submitted by 
the defendants ." T. 217. 
The error committed in so far as Instruction No. 6 is 
concerned was compounded by the trial court's erroneous 
instruction as to the elements of the crime of tampering 
under the statute. The trial court instructed the jury in 
Instruction No. 7: 
To constitute the crime of tampering 
with a witness as it applies to the circumstances 
of this case, it must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
1. That the defendants believed an 
official proceeding or investigation was 
either pending or about to be instituted 
pertaining to suspected illegal sale of liquor 
by Mr. James Garner, doing business as J & M 
Saloon, and 
2. That they induced or otherwjs~ caused 
Ray Applegate to make a false statement. * * *F. 91. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The defendants' counsel strongly objected at trial to this 
instruction. T. 217. 
Instruction No. 7 is an inaccurate statement of the law. 
The statute plainly requires that before a person can be convicted 
of the crime of tampering he must have, inter alia, induced 
or otherwise caused a person to "testify or inform falsely." 
No matter how morally reprehensive it might be to cause some 
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one to "make a false statement," in effect to lie, such is 
not a crime under this statute. If the defendant does not 
cause the victim to testify or inform falsely, he cannot be 
convicted- under the statute no matter how many false 
statements or lies he causes another to communicate. Of 
course, much depends upon the definition this Court gives 
the words "testify" and "inform". 
Counsel also excepted to the trial court's failure to 
give defendants' Requested Instructions No. 2 and No. 3 
which properly define the terms "testify" and "inform." T. 
218. 
Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 2 states: 
Testify as used in the statute means to give 
evidence according to law. 
"Testify" is a highly specific term and means more than 
merely "making statements." This specific meaning is 
amplified in Blacks Law Dictionary (4th Ed., 1968) at 1646 
TESTIFY. To bear witness; to give evidence 
as a witness to make a solemn declaration, 
under oath or affirmation, in a judicial inquiry 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact. [Citations.] 
That the meaning of the word "testify" is to make 
statements "under oath or affirmation" is borne out by a 
legion of citations in 41A Words and Phrases 28, "TESTIFY. 
Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 2 substantially 
embodied this concept. The difference between giving 
evidence according to law, upon oath or affirmation, and 
merely making statements is fundamental. The trial court 
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Instruction No. 7 was an inaccurate statement of the law, 
and the failure to give defendants' Requested Instruction 
No. 2 allowed the jury to convict these defendants for 
causing Applegate to make false statements, not for causing 
him to testify falsely as the statute requires. Moreover, 
if this Court sustains Instruction No. 7, and causing or 
inducing someone to make false statements without criminal 
intent becomes a crime under the statute and the Court's 
interpretation thereof, then §76-8-508 would be totally 
unconstitutional on the grounds of overbreadth. Such 
interpretation would make a mere lie a third degree felony 
and subject a defendant to criminal strict liability because 
he could always be charged with "believing" that somewhere 
in this State, some kind of proceeding or investigation was 
pending or about to be instituted. 
Counsel objected to the trial court's failure to give 
Requested Instruction No. 3 which defined the term "inform": 
Inform as used in the statute means 
to make an accusation against another-whom 
he suspects of the violation of some penal 
statute. T. 218. 
The word "inform" is apparently a general term, and has 
no specific meaning to the same extent as the word "testify." 
See 21 words and Phrases, 605, "INFORM". Under the familiar 
doctrine of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, the 
general term "inform" must be given a more specific inter-
pretation in view of the preceding highly specific term, 
"testify." 
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Thus, to "inform• under the statute requires an "oath or 
affirmation." Defendants' additional interpretation of the 
statutory term, in Requested Instruction No. 3, suggested 
that an oath or affirmation had to be made in the form of 0 
"accusation against another" suspected "of the violation of 
some penal statute." The failure to give Requested 
Instruction No. 3, compounded the error of the trial court 
in giving Instruction No. 7, and the jury convicted the 
defendants for having caused Ray Applegate to "make false 
statements" rather than for having caused him to "inform 
falsely" as required by §76-8-508. The trial court could 
have substantially overcome these fatal deficiencies in it~ 
instructions had the Court given the defendants' Requested 
Instruction Nos. 2, 3, and 7. 
In Requested Instruction No. 4, defense counsel set 
forth the substance of one of his theories of the case: 
If you find that the statements signed 
by Ray Applegate were voluntarily signed by 
him, you must find the defendants not guilty. 
That the defendants were entitled to have the jury instru~ 
on their theories of the case, for which competent eviden0 
had been adduced, is the rule in this State. State v. New 
105 Utah 561, 144 P.2d 290, 292 (1943); State v. Johnson, 
112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738, 743-744 (1947); and State v. 
Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (1979). 
The defense theory was that Ray Applegate, although 
intoxicated, had voluntarily signed the statements prepare 
by the defendants. The testimony of both the defendants 
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supported this theory, (T. 159-161, 186-189) and it was 
prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse Requested 
Instruction No. 4. If Applegate did voluntarily sign the 
statements, then, regardless of his inebriated condition, 
and regardless of the falsity of the statements, defendants 
could not be guilty of the crime for which they were charged. 
By having refused this instruction, the trial court denied 
the jury its prerogative to consider the defendants' theory 
of the case, and effectively hampered the defendants' 
constitutional right to present a defense. See In re Oliver, 
33 U.S. 257, 273, 275, 68 s.ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948), 
and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 
1038, 35 L.Ed 2d 297 (1973). 
Requested Instruction No. 5 posited another of the 
defendants' theories of the case: 
Should you find the statements signed by 
Applegate were not voluntarily signed, you 
must nevertheless find the defendants not 
guilty if you also find any of the f9Jlowing 
to be true: 
1. The statements signed were factually 
correct 
If the statements signed by Applegate were true, and 
James Garner had been selling liquor illegally and had 
interfered with the investigation being conducted by the 
defendants, then Anderson and Brackenbury could not be found 
guilty as charged. The above analysis on the right of a 
defendant to have his theory of the case presented to the 
jury if he has introduced evidence in support thereof, is 
equally applicable here. 
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The testimony of Jack Danzy and Michael Branegan 
supported the defendants' contention that James Garner had 
been selling liquor illegally. T. 118-124, and 199-201. 
The defendants both testified as to the altercation between 
Anderson and Garner. T. 156 and 183-184. Enough competent 
evidence had been introduced to warrant the submission of 
this theory of defendants to the jury. 
Finally, the trial court erred in refusing to give t~ 
defendants' Requested Instruction No. 6 which stated: 
When you are considering the credibility 
and ability to remember of a witness you 
may take into consideration, among other 
things, the state of intoxication of the 
witness and the extent to which it has 
affected his ability to remember events and 
occurrences. 
Ray Applegate was the key witness for the prosecution 
His testimony was the most damning to these defendants. 
rebuttal to his testimony, the defendants' testimony sub-
stantially contradicted every major part of his story. D 
considering the defendants' testimony, however, the jury 
consciously or subconsciously was scrutinizing and weighir 
the credibility of the same. Everything to which the 
defendants testified could have been in the eyes of the 
jury, in the defendants' own self interest. That recogni· 
by the jury probably had a profound effect upon their 
assessment of the defendants' credibility. 
Substantial evidence was introduced at trial concern 
the intoxicated state of Ray Applegate in the afternoon a 
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evening of May 28, 1978. T. 143-144; 159-161 and 184-186. 
Even Applegate, in cross examination, admitted that he had 
consumed a substantial amount of liquor on the afternoon and 
evening in question. T. 82-84. 
There can be no question that one's perception of 
events and circumstances is different when one is even 
partially inebriated. This difference in perception has a 
substantial effect on one's credibility when recounting 
experiences gained while inebriated, even in a subsequent, 
more sober setting. The battles fought, the dragons slain, 
the women charmed, and the mighty deeds done are somehow far 
less credible when one knows that the storyteller was inebriated 
at the time of his retold triumphs. 
As a proper counter-balance to the jury's conscious or 
sub-conscious assessment of the defendants' credibility, the 
jury should have been instructed to consider Ray Applegate's 
state of intoxication as it related to his credibility as 
the State's primary witness. The failure to have given that 
instruction unmistakenly prejudiced the cause of the 
defendants. 
Because of the failure of the trial court to properly 
instruct the jury as outlined herein, this Court should 
reverse and remand the cause for a new trial. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ROGER ANDERSON AND THOMAS BRACKENBURY CANNOT 
BE GUILTY OF VIOLATING 76-8-508 AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The point is simple--the State never proved that Ray 
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Applegate testified or informed falsely. The statements to 
which Ray Applegate signed his name on May 28, 1978 were m 
evidence given according to law, under oath or affirmation, 
Thus, he was not induced or otherwise caused to testify 
falsely. Moreover, Applegate never made an oath or 
affirmation in the form of an "accusation against another" 
suspected "of the violation of some penal statute." 
Applegate did not inform falsely. The insufficiency of t~ 
evidence in this regard leads to the conclusion that the 
defendants could not be guilty of having violated the 
statute as a matter of law. 
Moreover, even if Applegate was induced or otherwise 
caused to make false statements, the State failed to show 
that such were ever used in an official proceeding, or ev~ 
intended to be used in such a proceeding. Implicit within 
76-8-508 is the requirement that the false testimony or 
information have been actually used in an official 
proceeding. At the time the Applegate statemen-ts-were 
given, only a police investigation was pending, and the 
State failed to show that the defendants knew or believed 
any official proceeding whatsoever was pending or about to 
be instituted. The statements themselves were never used 
any proceeding until their admission into evidence at the 
trial of these defendants. Any contentions to the contrar 
were never proven at trial. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the statements made by Apple 
were completely and totally false, and that the defendants 
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knew that the statements were false, the defendants are, 
nevertheless, not guilty, as a matter of law, of the crime 
charged. There is no question that Applegate was never in 
any manner or at any time requested to testify in any proceeding 
concerning the illegal sale of liquor. The evidence 
demonstrated that Applegate left town the evening of the 
event and did not return to the State of Utah until the day 
prior to the trial of this case. Applegate was never requested 
to "inform" any person other than the defendants, nor were 
his written statements ever used to "inform" any persons other 
than the defendants. The defendants themselves could not be 
"informed" falsely because they would know these statements 
were false. 
Based upon the above analysis, the cause should be 
reversed because the defendants cannot be guilty, as a 
matter of law, of violating the statute. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT THOMAS BRACKENBURY WAS GRANTED I-MM-UNITY AND 
THEREFORE, WAS IMPROPERLY TRIED AND CONVICTED. 
Traditionally, two kinds of immunity from criminal 
prosecution have received constitutional recognition and 
approbation--"use and derivative use" and "transactional" 
immunity. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 
S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Transactional immunity 
precludes prosecution "for any 'transaction, matter or 
thing' about which the witness is compelled to testify." 
.'.'tate~ ward, 571 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah, 1977). (Wilkins, 
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J., dissenting.) Use and derivative use immunity, however, 
"pcohibits the use of immunized testimony or other immuni 21 
information, but does not prohibit a subsequent prosecutio 
based on independent evidence." Id. 
In outlining the scope of immunity in Utah, the 
Legislature failed to deploy the traditional nomenclature 
either "transactional" or "use and derivative use" immunit 
The statute, which was the subject of vigorous controversy 
in Ward, supra, reads in pertinent part: 
In any investigation or prosecution of a 
criminal case, the attorney general and any 
district attorney or county attorney shall 
have the power to grant immunity from pro-
secution to any person who is called or 
who is intended to be called as a witness 
in behalf of the State of Utah whenever the 
attorney general, district attorney or 
county attorney deems that the testimony of 
such person is necessary to the investigation 
and prosecution of such a case. No 
prosecution shall be instituted against 
the person for any crime disclosed by his 
testimony which is privileged under this 
action, provided that should the person 
testify falsely, nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to prevent prosecution 
for perjury. U.C.A., §77-45-21 (Emphasis 
added). 
Although the statute does not specifically use the 
terms "use and derivative use" or "transactional," the d 
inference is that the immunity authorized under this sect 
is transactional. The statute states that "no prosecutio 
shall be instituted against the person for any crime disc 
by his testimony which is privileged under this action," 
this language, 
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although.not the traditional language of 
tran~action, m~t~er or thing," conveys a 
meaning more similar to that of transactional 
immunity. Furthermore, it is specifically 
set out that this statute confers the "power 
to grant immunity from prosecution." Were 
the statute intended to be the use type, more 
precise wording would have been used, not 
precluding prosecution, but precluding the 
use of immunized testimony in a prosecution. 
Ward, supra, at 1347 (Wilkins, J. dissenting, 
with whom Maughan, J. concurred.) 
The majority in Ward did not reach the issue as to the 
quality of immunity conferred by the statute. 
In the present case, the defendant Thomas Brackenbury's 
deposition was taken on July 11, 1978. During the course of 
the taking of the deposition, and in response to defense 
counsel's assertion of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights 
unless immunity were granted, the County Attorney responded: 
MR. CALL: Well, the County Attorney's office 
will grant Mr. Brackenbury immunity as to the 
testimony regarding the incident in the bar 
and involving James Garner and as to nothing else. 
MR. UNGRITCH: Is that going to be the limit 
of the scope of examination at this time? 
MR. CALL: Well, to the extent that we are able 
to go beyond that we will. We will go into that 
in some detail, but we have other areas we'd like 
to go into, but we will grant immunity only to 
the incident relating to the bar and to James 
Garner, and to his activities as Justice of the 
Peace in relation to the arrests and the people 
brought before him. Deposition of Thomas Brackenbury, 
at p. 4. (Emphasis added.) 
It is defendant Brackenbury's position that the County 
Attorney actually granted him immunity in two independent 
areas, either of which was sufficient to preclude his prosecution 
and conviction in this case. First, Brackenbury was granted 
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immunity as to "testimony regarding the incident in the b~ 
and involving James Garner." What the County Attorney was 
actually thinking when he made this statement is irreleven1 
it is what he communicated to counsel and the defendant 
which should control this inquiry. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the defendant was 
compelled to testify about the "incident in the bar" becaw 
of the grant of transactional immunity. During the course 
of that testimony, the defendant revealed other "transact~ 
matters, and things" relating to the charge on which he w~ 
actually convicted. The statute clearly states that "no 
prosecution shall be instituted against the person for any 
crime disclosed by his testimony which is privileged under 
this action," and in order to preserve the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination--which 
right immunity statutes are designed to protect--any 
ambiguities in a grant of immunity must be resolved agains 
the governmental officer making the grant. 
Secondly, Brackenbury was granted immunity as "to his 
activities as Justice of the Peace in relation to the arre 
and the people brought before him." This statement of 
immunity is so broad that, on its face and with little 
analysis, defendant submits that it easily encompasses the 
charge on which he was ultimately convicted. 
It was the theory of the State at trial that Brackenb 
was acting in his office as Justice of the Peace at the ti 
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the alleged crime took place. It was the uncontradicted 
testimony of the State's key witness, Ray Applegate, that 
Brackenbury had announced at the time of the alleged 
incident that "the Justice Court of Soldier Summit, Utah is 
in session--it is in session" and proceeded to inform 
Applegate that he was "charged with interferring with an 
officer." T. 63. Whether this confrontation between the 
defendant and Applegate is deemed an arrest, arraignment, or 
preliminary hearing is irrelevent in so far as the determination 
of the question of immunity is concerned. The confrontation 
was obviously within the scope of defendant's "activities as 
Justice of the Peace" and related to "the arrests and the 
people brought before him," and was thus within the grant of 
immunity referred to above. Again, the County Attorney's 
subjective state of mind is irrelevent to this consideration. 
Defense counsel made a timely motion to dismiss as to 
Thomas Brackenbury, based upon the grant of immunity, well 
in advance of the preliminary hearing. Again at the 
preliminary hearing, counsel objected to the further 
prosecution of the defendant on the grounds of the immunity 
granted. PHT 31. The same objection was also raised at 
trial. T. 70. Perhaps because of the confusion and 
controversy which surrounds §77-45-21, defendants motions 
were denied. It should be remembered, however, that: 
a state cannot substitute for the privilege 
against self-incrimination an intricate 
[)r confusingly inadequate] scheme for 
conferring immunity and thereafter hold in 
contempt those who have failed to fully 
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perceive its subtleties. 81 Am.Jur.2d 94, 
Witnesses §58. Cf. Stevens v. Marks, 383 
U.S. 234, 242-244, 86 S.Ct. 788, 15 L.Ed.2d 
724 (1966). 
Defendant Thomas Brackenbury respectfully prays that 
his conviction be reversed on the ground that he was granb 
complete immunity from prosecution for this charge. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the defendants were denied their constitutioru 
right to a fair preliminary hearing; because the statute 
under which they were charged and convicted is unconstitut 
vague and overbroad; because the ambiguities of the Statub 
itself were propounded to the jury by inadequate jury 
instructions; and because the defendants, based upon the 
evidentiary presentation at trial, could not as a matter o' 
law have been guilty of violating the statute, the defen& 
respectfully request this Court to reverse their convict~ 
and dismiss the information. In the alternative, the 
defendants request the Court to reverse the cause and re~ 
the same for a new trial. 
Because defendant Brackenbury was granted immunity ~ 
the County Attorney, pursuant to statutory authority, his 
conviction should be vacated and his name should be expu~ 
from the public records of these proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 19th day of July, 1979. 
· S. ZREX '1iEWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North Street 
Provo, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellants 
to Mr. J. Harold Call, Wasatch County Attorney, 30 North 
Main Street, Suite 13, Heber City, Utah 84032, and Mr. 
Robert Hansen, Attorney General, State of Utah, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this 19th 
day of July, 1979. ~, /~d, ,,~. /'_tt~ If./'-' 
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